20. Passage I: Read the passages given below and answer the questions No. 24-27
The establishment and growth of liberal parliamentarism and party democracy in India can be read as the consequence of an interactive process between raj liberal refonn measures and nationalist responses to them. Successive generatio"ns of a burgeoning political class acquired a stake in parliamentary institutions and became skillful in deploying them. Among the lessons they learned was learning to lose.
There was a particular division of labor in the building of political institutions. The structures and playbook for parliamentarianism, the vehicle of policy-making and deliberation, were initially supplied by Britain as it introduced legislative councils. However, Indian nationalists supplied the party, the component of the new institutions that would make them democratic.
If Britain provided a parliamentary model and Congress supplied party structure, Nehru and Gandhi, in different ways, articulated a political culture that could sustajn parliamentary institutions. They drew on different normative traditions. Nehru, educated in English political culture, provided a model of parliamentary civility, respect for opponents, restraint on those actions of the ruling party that would unfairly damage the opposition, willingness to observe rules when they were to one's disadvantage.
Gandhi's mode of conducting the nationalist movement complemented and reinforced Nehru's commitment to parliamentary procedure. For Gandhi, these rules, however, arose as much out of the philosophy of satyagraha-respect for the humanity, values, and interests of the opponent, and adherence to non-violence- as out of the British protocols. His adherence to the view that means governed ends, and not the reverse, reinforced the restraints built into the rules of a functioning parliamentary system.
By 1947, the colonial and nationalist experience had equipped India's growing political class with knowledge of parliamentary institutions, electoral processes, and party organization. Starting with the municipal government in the 1870s and extending through the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 and into the reforms of the Government of India Act of 1935, India's political class learned a good deal about how to operate legislative, electoral and party institutions.
The legislative experience was paralleled by the organizational experience accumulated by Congress, an experience that served it when, at independence, it had to organize itself as a political party. Much of the organization building was the work of Gandhi, whose reputation for spirituality and whose role as architect of civil disobedience tend to obscure his capacities as an organizational genius. In 1920, he transformed the Congress from an institution catering to anglicized elites to a popular organization capable of reaching into the urban lower classes and rural areas. In consequence, Congress emerged at independence with broad experience in popular participation and as a political class capable of deploying wide-reaching networks.
Nevertheless, Congress developed ideas about "loyal opposition" and learning to lose from its own internal governance experience and political rivalries, as well as in its relationship to the British colonial state. The first of the internal battles over strategy, ideology, and leadership that contributed to Congress learning to lose was the split in December of 1905 between the "extremists" and the "moderates." The moderates led by Gokhale prevailed, and Tilak and the "extremists" were expelled. When Gandhi assumed leadership of the Congress in 1920, part of his appeal was his ability to combine the moderates' non-violent means for self-rule with the direct action of the extremists. The various resolutions of the Surat split between the moderates and extremists helped Congress learn to lose by normalizing the practice of dissent and opposition.
Another split occurred in 1922 over the issue of "Council entry," resulting in the formation of the Swaraj Party. When Muslim-Hindu differences erupted in the mid-1920s, the Swaraj Party split (in i 926), with some members joining the Hindu Mahasabha and some rejoining the Congress. Again, as in 1907, the idea and practice of dissent and opposition had been normalized.
Less visible to the public gaze but important for developing a political culture within the Congress that recognized learning to lose were momentous struggles between its pre-eminent leaders, Gandhi and Nehru. The first of these struggles took place in 1927-9 over whether Congress should continue, as Gandhi believed it should,: with the political objective of Dominion Status or, as Nehru advocated, change its objective to puma swaraj, complete independence. The struggle was intense, involving competition for the loyalty of the younger generation. It took place behind the scenes during Congress' annual sessions in December 1927, 1928, and 1929. Gandhi "lost," but in a prudent gesture of conciliation, himself offered the resolution for puma swaraj at the annual session in 1929. The pre-eminent leader of the Congress enacted a visible and exemplary instance of losing to his rival.
This experience and others like it fostered an expectation that dissent and opposition need not be subversive, destabilizing, or destructive. Congress' experience with internal struggles normalized the idea of regulated conflict. Congress' political culture made it possible to rule and be ruled in tum. Losers could acquiesce in their loss because they could expect to become winners.
(Adapted from: "Congress learns to lose: From a one-party dominant to a multiparty system in India", Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd L Rudolph, Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose, Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong (eds) New York: Routledge. 15-
41.)
Q. According to the authors of this article, 'learning to lose' contributed to: (University of Hyderabad Ph.D 2020)